321

Book Review
Mark V. Tushnet, Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle Over Guns.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 176, $19.95.
Reviewed by Dennis A. Henigan
Rarely does an author go to the trouble of writing a book about a subject
in which he has little interest. Yet that apparently is what Harvard Law School
Professor Mark Tushnet did in Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle
Over Guns. He acknowledges as much in the Introduction: “Before writing this
book, I had only an academic interest in the Second Amendment—and I still
do; neither the Second Amendment nor gun policy generally ranks high on
my list of concerns” (xv). Tushnet writes not only as a disinterested observer,
but as a largely uninterested observer.
This unusual vantage point has much to do with the tone and content of this
book. The author writes as a thoughtful, dispassionate onlooker, encountering
the arguments on both sides of the gun issue for the first time. There is much
that is rewarding about following Professor Tushnet as he winds his way
through the arguments, displaying his considerable descriptive and analytic
skills. In short, much of Out of Range is truly enjoyable reading.
It is not surprising that Tushnet regards neither the Second Amendment
nor gun policy as high on his list of personal concerns, since the core theme
of the book is that the gun debate is not over legal or policy issues that have
importance in themselves, but rather is a debate about something else entirely—
as he puts it, “about how we understand ourselves as Americans” (xix). In his
view, the gun issue is yet another battle in the perpetual “culture wars,” in
which great heat is generated on both sides about legal and policy questions
that turn out to be of little significance. According to Tushnet, interest groups
function to fan the cultural flames on both sides of the issue in order to bring
in donations, but neither policy proposals to expand gun ownership and
carrying, nor those to further regulate it, are likely to make any difference to
the level of gun crime and violence (76).
There is no question that there are important cultural dimensions to the
gun issue. For many Americans, the gun has enormous symbolic significance
as the wellspring of individual liberty and the guarantor of a free society. And,
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for many on the gun control side, it is difficult to understand how guns can be
seen as anything other than instruments of death and destruction.
But, as I develop more fully below, it is surely possible to acknowledge the
cultural dimensions of the gun issue without reaching the conclusion that there
is nothing more at stake. For example, Tushnet concludes that “gun policies
of any sort probably have relatively little effect on the level of gun violence,
not to mention violent crime” (130). This claim is largely unsupported in his
text and, in fact, is contradicted by a wealth of empirical evidence that remains
unmentioned in the book. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions giving
a broad reading to the Second Amendment (issued after the publication of the
book) may well have the paradoxical effect of lessening the cultural intensity
of the gun debate, allowing a greater focus on the practical benefits of gun
regulation for public safety.
Tushnet’s theme—that the gun debate is “much ado about nothing,”
except the culture wars—is the central flaw in Out of Range. Having begun his
examination of the gun issue from a largely “uninterested” perspective, Out of
Range essentially functions as an elaborate justification of that perspective. The
“uninterested observer” point of view gives the book one of its strengths—its
radical dispassionateness—but turns out also to be the source of its greatest
weakness in its failure to make any serious effort to understand the public
health and safety importance of gun regulation.
Perhaps this is an appropriate point for me to recognize that, given my own
record as a gun control advocate, it should come as no surprise that I would
have a problem with a text suggesting that stronger gun laws would have no
impact on crime or violence. Indeed, I have worked for over twenty years for
one of the groups—the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence—that Tushnet
sees as a big part of the problem, because such groups (he also includes the
National Rifle Association here) simply stir up the cultural war on guns,
distracting attention from other policies not involving gun regulation that
could have a real impact in making us safer.
To this I would respond that disinterested, or even uninterested, observers
can be wrong, while passionately committed advocates can be right. It should
be the quality of the arguments and evidence that ultimately matters, not the
mindset of the advocate. Tushnet’s “uninterested” approach has not cornered
the market on insight. Indeed, it deprives Out of Range of the depth required for
a more satisfying illumination of a very complex issue.
The Second Amendment Debate
Most of the book is devoted to the clash of arguments over the meaning
of the Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”1 Of course, much has happened on that front since
Out of Range was published in 2007. A year later, the Supreme Court issued its
1.

U.S. Const. amend. II.
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landmark ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller,2 a 5–4 decision striking down
the District of Columbia’s handgun ban and holding, for the first time in
our history, that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to possess a gun
in the home for self-defense, with no necessity of a connection between gun
possession and a “well regulated Militia.” Since the District of Columbia is
a federal enclave, Heller established this right only as to the District and the
federal government, reserving the question whether the Second Amendment
right, as newly defined, applies as a restraint on states and localities through
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In June 2010, the Supreme Court, in McDonald
v. City of Chicago, answered this question in the affirmative, by the same 5–4 vote
that had decided Heller.4 The McDonald Court struck down Chicago’s handgun
ban as a violation of the Second Amendment.
Tushnet’s treatment is very much a “first impression” of the Second
Amendment debate. In his words, he has “described the main lines of
argument,” but “can’t pretend that my discussion here deals with every nuance
of the arguments made by proponents of gun rights and those of gun control”
(25). Of course, Tushnet is free to provide a “once over lightly” account. It also
is legitimate to inquire whether his first impression may be misleading, once
the inquiry goes a bit deeper.
Tushnet finds the opposing arguments about the Second Amendment “in
reasonably close balance.” If a strictly originalist approach is used—that is, if an
“understanding of its terms when it was adopted” were the only issue—Tushnet
finds that the pro-gun-rights position “is a bit stronger than the alternative”
(xvi). However, he finds an exclusively originalist approach defective as a
general interpretive principle. If original meaning is used merely as a starting
point and other interpretive tools, such as precedent, are taken into account,
Tushnet finds that “[g]un control proponents have a significantly stronger case
than their adversaries…” (xvi).
The role of originalism in the debate is an interesting subtext of Tushnet’s
discussion. Given his conclusion that supporters of gun control have a much
better case if originalism is given a minor part in the debate, he is puzzled
about “why gun-control proponents think they should fight” on “textual
and originalist grounds” (68). He must be equally puzzled as to why Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Heller devotes so much attention to the original meaning
2.

128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).

3.

Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n.23.

4.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08–1521 (U.S. Sup. Ct. decided June 28, 2010). It should
be noted, however, that there was no majority for a common theory explaining how the
Second Amendment applies to states and localities. Four justices, in a plurality opinion by
Justice Alito, determined that the Second Amendment applies through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not through that Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause. McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 44 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). In his
concurrence, Justice Thomas adopted the Privileges or Immunities theory, but rejected the
Due Process theory. Id. at 1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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issue (although it also addresses precedent and other considerations as well),
and why Justice Breyer, in his dissent in McDonald, continues the attack on
Heller’s analysis of original meaning.5
My own view is that the fight on “textual and originalist grounds” is
unavoidably important to understanding the Second Amendment because
the text itself is so foreign to contemporary ears. How are we to even begin to
understand what a “well regulated Militia” is without trying to discern what
the phrase meant in 1791? What is it to “keep and bear Arms”? To contemporary
courts, the Second Amendment must appear as if written in a foreign language.
This is not to say that original meaning is the only relevant interpretive tool,
but it is certainly easy to understand why it has assumed such a dominant role
in the Second Amendment debate.
The fact that the text seems so opaque to modern readers does not
necessarily mean that its original meaning is, as Tushnet seems to think, a close
question. The text may need translation, but its meaning is not necessarily
destined to be unclear once the proper techniques of translation are used. A
careful analysis of the historical record makes a strong case that the subject
matter of the Second Amendment is entirely the distribution of military power
between state militias and a federal standing army, and has nothing to do with
the right to have a gun for personal purposes.
In this conclusion, I have good company. Justice Stevens’s powerful
dissent in Heller plainly did not find it to be a close question, concluding
that the majority opinion “has utterly failed” to establish a non-militia,
personal right “as a matter of text or history.”6 It also is revealing that the
originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right
to be armed for personal, non-militia purposes receives virtually no support
among professional historians. Of the sixteen academic historians who joined
briefs amicus curiae in Heller, fifteen argued for the militia purpose view.7 The
historians’ attack on the personal purpose reading has continued in earnest
5.

McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 2–5 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

6.

Heller, 129 S.Ct. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

7.

The historical case supporting the view that the original meaning of the Second Amendment
concerned the bearing of arms in an organized militia was persuasively presented in a brief
filed in Heller by fifteen academic historians. See Brief of Jack N. Rakove et al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (No. 07–290). Only one professional
historian, Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm of George Mason University Law School, filed a
brief in Heller supporting the contrary view as a matter of original meaning. Brief of the
CATO Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (No. 07–290). Long before Heller, historians had
maintained a full-scale assault on the theory that the original meaning of the Second
Amendment was to guarantee the right to have guns apart from militia service. See e.g., Saul
Cornell, A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control
in America (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The
Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent (Duke Univ.
Press 2002); Carl T. Bogus (ed.), The Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians
and Constitutional Scholars on the Right To Bear Arms (New Press 2000).
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after Heller, with twenty-four historians (and one political science professor)
joining amicus briefs in McDonald v. City of Chicago sharply critical of the Heller
majority’s treatment of original meaning.8 Indeed, in his McDonald dissent,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor, noted “[s]ince
Heller, historians, scholars, and judges have continued to express the view
that the Court’s historical analysis was flawed.”9 Justice Breyer was moved
to ask: “If history, and history alone, is what matters, why would the Court
not now reconsider Heller in light of these more recently published historical
views?”10 Those who support the Heller ruling on originalist grounds ought
to experience some discomfort from the withering criticism of the majority
opinion from those with expertise in the history of the period and the meaning
of the text to those who lived that history.11
Professor Tushnet may regard the issue of original meaning as a close
question in part because of the way he frames the question. For Tushnet, the
issue is whether the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right”
(and he describes various versions of that theory), or whether it creates a
“collective right” or “states’ right,” i.e. “the right of the states to organize their
own militias, roughly, the state-organized National Guard we now have” (48).
The use of this terminology gives the “individual right” view an immediate
advantage, because the text clearly grants the right to “the people,” which
intuitively means individuals, not states. Moreover, it places a difficult burden
8.

Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
McDonald (No. 08–1521); Brief of Historians on Early American Legal, Constitutional and
Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, McDonald (No. 08–1521).
The scholarly literature also reflects the historians’ hostility to the Heller majority’s version
of original meaning. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History:
“Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1095 (2009); David Thomas
Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the
Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1295
(2009); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Originalism on Trial].

9.

McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 3 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

10.

Id. at 5.

11.

It could be argued that Tushnet’s judgment that the original meaning of the Second
Amendment is a close question was vindicated by the Heller Court’s 5–4 vote, as well as by
the sheer length of the majority’s discussion of original meaning. As I have developed in
more detail elsewhere, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is far more an exercise in ideology
than in principled constitutional adjudication, even under the banner of originalism. See
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1171 (2009). As to the length of
Scalia’s opinion, I prefer the view of Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit and the most prolific conservative legal scholar of our time, who found
the length of the opinion “evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to produce snow
jobs.” Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control,
The New Republic, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32. For a provocative critique of Heller by another
prominent conservative jurist, who denounced the opinion as “judicial lawmaking,” see J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev.
253 (2009).
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on the advocate of a “collective right” interpretation to explain how a right
granted to “the people” could be “collective,” but not be “individual” at all.
This Second Amendment issue need not, and should not, be framed in this
way, although it often is, by courts and commentators.12 There is no doubt
that the text confers the right on “the people.” The issue is the nature and
scope of the right conferred on “the people.” Is it a right to be armed for
personal, non-militia purposes? Or is it a right to be armed only in connection
with service in the organized militia of the states? One of the most appealing
aspects of Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent is that it, at the outset, cuts through
the misleading terminology:
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment
protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it protects a
right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the
scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sporting
activities, and to perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly
does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that
it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain military purposes.
Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary
purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by
this case.13

With the issue posed in this way, the militia purpose view acquires new
strength. Indeed, this reframing of the issue shifts the burden to proponents
of the private purpose view to explain why the text begins with an assertion of
the importance of a “well regulated Militia” if the people’s right to keep and
bear arms is for purposes that may have nothing to do with militia service.
Apart from his framing of the issue, Tushnet’s assessment of text and original
meaning as a close question suffers from his failure to do the more penetrating
analysis needed to separate the strong arguments from the weak ones.
For example, Tushnet attaches unfortunate plausibility to the meaning of
the phrase “well regulated Militia” advanced by the private purpose advocates.
As he correctly describes it, their version of a “well regulated Militia” turns
out to be not “regulated” at all. Citing 18th century sources referring to the
militia as “composed of the body of the people,” Tushnet asserts* that the
militia “consisted of every able-bodied mature white male…[and] not an
organization with a list of qualifications for membership, or indeed any sort of
‘organization’ at all” (10). If the “well regulated Militia” is simply a term for
12.

For a discussion of the frequently misleading framing of the Second Amendment issue, see
Dennis A. Henigan, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The D.C. Circuit on the Second Amendment,
18 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 209, 223 n.78, 225 n.84 (2008). See also David Yassky, The
Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 588,
613–615 (2000).

13.

Heller, 128 S.Ct.at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the body of armed individuals who could be organized into a fighting force
(but haven’t been), there seems little tension between the use of that phrase
and the guarantee of a right to possess guns for the private purposes of those
same individuals. “As a matter of original understanding,” Tushnet writes,
“this interpretation seems unassailable” (10).
Actually, this interpretation of the “well regulated Militia” is quite assailable.
There is no question that the militias of the founding era were composed of the
vast majority of able-bodied males. However, the concept of an “unorganized
militia” was foreign to that era.14 Indeed, it is fair to say that a militia came
into being only through individuals being organized into a militia.15 As Justice
Stevens’s Heller dissent painstakingly shows, the pre-constitutional militias were
organized by operation of state law.16 In short, the “well regulated Militia” was
a system of compulsory military service imposed on much of the adult male
population. As Noah Webster described it in his legendary 1828 dictionary,
“The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies,
regiments and brigades…and required by law to attend military exercises on
certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations.”17
Militiamen were ordinary citizens pursuing “their usual occupations,” thus
distinguishing the militia from the professional soldiers of what was then
called the “standing army.”18
After finding “unassailable” the idea that the “well regulated Militia” was
simply the unorganized body of armed citizens, Tushnet struggles with the
concept of the militia reflected in the body of the Constitution. The “militia
clauses” of the Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, gave Congress new authority
over the militia, which previously had been entirely state-organized. Congress
14.

It is true that the definition of “militia” in current federal law distinguishes between the
“organized militia” and the “unorganized militia.” Under this provision, the “organized
militia” is the National Guard and the “unorganized militia” is “all able-bodied males at
least 17 years of age and…under 45 years of age…” who are not in the National Guard or the
Naval Militia. 10 U.S.C. §311. However, this distinction between the “organized” and the
“unorganized” militia was a creation of the Dick Act of 1903, which gave birth to the modern
National Guard system. See generally Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second
Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. Dayton
Law Rev. 5, 34–39 (1989) (discussing history of the militia). It was a distinction unknown to
the Framers.

15.

Tushnet finds the analogy between militias and juries to be instructive in several respects (35,
38). If we were to take the analogy seriously, however, it would seem to defeat any notion
of the militia as being the unorganized body of the people. There is no legitimate use of
the term “jury” that refers to the unorganized body of the people. The jury, like the militia,
comes into being precisely by being organized according to the rules established by a system
of law.

16.

Heller, 128 S.Ct., at 2825 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

17.

Noah Webster, Noah Webster’s First Edition of an American Dictionary of the English
Language (7th ed., Found. for American Christian Education 1993).

18.

That the militia of the founding era consisted of most able-bodied males also distinguishes
it from the National Guard, the closest modern analogue to the “well regulated Militia” of
the 18th century, but hardly equivalent to it.

328

Journal of Legal Education

was given power to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia,” as well as “calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasion.” The states retained the power
to appoint militia officers and to train the militia “according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.”19 Indeed, the animating concern leading to adoption
of the Second Amendment was the fear of the Anti-Federalist opponents of
the Constitution that the grant of power to Congress to organize and arm the
militia amounted to an exclusive power to do so, thus giving Congress the
power to destroy the state militias through federal hostility or neglect.20 The
Second Amendment was written to allay these concerns by making the keeping
and bearing of arms in a state militia a “right of the people,” not dependent
on federal action.21 It ensured that the state militias would be armed, even if
Congress abandoned them.
In the final analysis, to read the “well regulated Militia” in the Second
Amendment to mean the unorganized body of armed citizens is necessarily
to find that the Framers adopted an entirely different understanding of the
militia in the Second Amendment than that embodied in the militia clauses of
the Constitution. This seems unlikely, to say the least.
Tushnet recognizes the problem, commenting that “[r]eading the Second
Amendment against the background of the original Constitution’s references
to the militia, we might conclude that the Second Amendment’s preamble
refers to the state-organized militia” (14). What was, a few pages before, the
“unassailable” originalist view of the “well regulated Militia” as “unorganized,”
now becomes “something of a stretch” (14), once the Second Amendment’s
reference to the militia is interpreted in light of the original meaning of the
militia clauses, in which the militia is a body organized at the direction of
governmental authority. Tushnet is able to toggle back and forth between
positions like this because he views his task as simply commenting on the
various arguments, not making a serious effort to cut through the competing
claims to discern the best answer. It is not clear, however, how the meaning of
the “well regulated Militia” in the Second Amendment is a close question at
all.
Although Tushnet, at one point, observes that “a lot will turn on what we
understand…a militia to be” (8), he treats the possible relationship between
the militia reference and the remainder of the Amendment in a way that
provides an avenue for entirely ignoring the militia language. As he poses
19.

U.S. Const., art I, §8, cl. 15–16.

20.

As noted in Justice Stevens’s dissent, Anti-Federalist George Mason argued during the
Virginia ratification debates that Congress’s new power would allow Congress to destroy
the militia by “rendering them useless—by disarming them…. Congress may neglect to
provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it,
for Congress has an exclusive power to arm them.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2833 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 379 (2d ed., Jonathon Elliot ed., Hein 1863)).

21.

See Uviller & Merkel, supra note 7.
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it, the question is whether the language about the “well regulated Militia”
limits or places conditions on the scope of the right, or whether the militia
reference merely explains why the right is placed in the Constitution (8). If
the militia language “is simply an explanation and not a condition,” then,
according to Tushnet, it may not matter whether the militia reference is to the
same organized militia addressed in the separate militia clauses (15).
Tushnet presents the issue of “condition” vs. “explanation” as a close
question only by ignoring what the Supreme Court has called “the first
principle of constitutional interpretation.”22 This principle—dating back to
Marbury v. Madison23—is that the Constitution must be interpreted such that
“real effect should be given to all the words it uses,”24 and that interpretations
rendering some of its words “mere surplusage” must be avoided.25 Treating the
militia language in the Second Amendment as merely “explanatory” violates
this rule because the meaning and scope of the people’s right to keep and bear
arms would be the same were the militia “explanation” to have been deleted.
The only way to read the Second Amendment consistent with this “first
principle” is to regard the militia language as providing the context essential
to understanding the meaning of the right guaranteed. It is surely instructive
that nowhere else in the Bill of Rights did the Framers append similar nonfunctional, “explanatory” language. To adopt the private purpose view is to
arbitrarily stipulate that the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment are
the only words in the Bill of Rights that have no functional meaning. As Justice
Stevens concludes: “When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is
most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia.”26
A final problem with Tushnet’s treatment is that he often does not
distinguish between the relative importance of various evidence of original
meaning. Some evidence is simply more persuasive than other evidence. A
good example is the version of the Second Amendment text offered by its
author, James Madison, to the First Congress:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well
armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person.27

22.

Wright v. United States, 302 US. 583, 588 (1938).

23.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).

24.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151–52 (1926) (citing Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 544
(1903)).

25.

See Wright, 302 U.S. at 588.

26.

Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

27.

The Complete Bill of Rights, The Drafts, Debates, Sources, & Origins 169 (Neil H. Cogan,
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (emphasis added).
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If the original meaning were to guarantee individuals the right to choose
to have a gun (or not to have one), why would it have made any sense for
Madison to include a conscientious objector clause? Tushnet himself observes
that “[a] provision guaranteeing individuals the right to keep and bear arms
wouldn’t have to contain an exemption for such objectors because they would
simply choose not to own weapons” (49). The presence of the conscientious
objector clause is powerful evidence that the author of the Second Amendment
regarded it as solely about the possession and use of guns in an organized
military force.
Moreover, the debates in the First Congress largely concerned the objection
of some Anti-Federalists that the conscientious objector clause would be
used to weaken the militia, an argument that presumably led to the clause’s
deletion. Representative Elbridge Gerry, for example, argued that the clause
would enable the government to “declare who are those religiously scrupulous,
and prevent them from bearing arms.”28 Gerry continued, “What, sir, is the
use of the militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the
bane of liberty.”29 This debate over the conscientious objector clause makes
no sense if the Amendment is understood simply to guarantee individuals
the right to have a gun for personal purposes unrelated to militia duty. Thus,
the legislative history of the clause establishes that the First Congress had
the same understanding of the text as did the drafter Madison. As Justice
Stevens summarized the matter in his Heller dissent, “The ultimate removal of
the clause, therefore, only serves to confirm the purpose of the Amendment to
protect against congressional disarmament, by whatever means, of the States’
militias.”30
Though Tushnet cites the history of the clause, he nevertheless observes
that though there were “scattered expressions during the run-up to the Second
Amendment’s adoption” consistent with the view that the Amendment
concerned only state militias, “you have to work pretty hard to elevate them
into a position of primary importance” (49–50). The reader is left to wonder
why the intense focus of the First Congress on whether conscientious objectors
should be exempt from militia service is not of primary, if not decisive,
importance in determining original meaning.31
28.

Helen Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, & Charlene Bangs Bickford, Creating the Bill of Rights:
The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress 182 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
1991).

29.

Id.

30.

Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2836 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

31.

It should be recognized that there is substantial disagreement among legal scholars and
judges about the relevance of legislative history to constitutional interpretation, though
Professor Tushnet does not enter that particular fray. Justice Scalia, for example, has long
been associated with the view that the intentions of the Framers are largely immaterial,
since the interpretive task is to determine the meaning of the text to, as he put it in Heller,
“ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788. The argument
against considering legislative history often cites the difficulty of determining the intentions
of the Framers with any certainty. In the case of the Second Amendment, however, that

Book Review: Out of Range

331

Apart from the controversy over the meaning of the Second Amendment
(which continues with vigor after Heller), there is the separate question of
the significance of the private purpose view for gun control laws. Tushnet
correctly points out that, for gun rights advocates, winning the battle over the
meaning of the Second Amendment “doesn’t mean winning the war” because
“[e]veryone agrees that legislatures have the power—sometimes—to regulate
the exercise of individual rights” (118). The issue is: How much leeway will
legislative bodies have to regulate guns after Heller?
Here Tushnet may well be prescient, when he comments that “substantial
amounts of gun control are constitutionally permissible even if we accept
the best versions of the arguments favored by gun-rights proponents” (xvi).
There is, in fact, important language in Heller suggesting that a broad range
of gun laws do not violate the newly discovered right. According to the Court
“[T]he right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”32 The Court then goes
out of its way to offer the assurance that “nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt” on several broad categories of gun control laws, which
the Court said remain “presumptively lawful” under the Court’s ruling. These
include “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms” (a category broad enough to include background checks, waiting
periods, licensing, registration, safety training, etc.), “prohibitions on carrying
concealed weapons” (a more restrictive policy than simply requiring a license
to carry concealed weapons), “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” and bans on
“dangerous and unusual weapons” (which could include machine guns and
semi-automatic assault weapons).33 Significantly, the Court added that these
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” are given “only as examples” and
that the list “does not purport to be exhaustive.”34
Although these comments are dicta, they have thus far proven to be
extraordinarily influential in the lower courts in protecting federal gun laws
from successful attack.35 Essentially, they have functioned to provide “safe
objection is far weaker because the legislative history so strongly supports one of the
competing interpretations of the text. It raises the question: Is it defensible to give the
Second Amendment a meaning entirely different from that understood by James Madison,
its primary drafter, and by the First Congress that debated and ratified it? In any event,
there is little evidence in the Heller majority opinion suggesting that “ordinary citizens” of
that era interpreted “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” as concerning private
self-defense, and not militia service, in a text that begins with a reference to the importance
of the “well regulated Militia” to the “security of a free State.” One prominent historian has
commented that “Justice Scalia’s brand of plain-meaning originalism is little more than a
smoke screen for his own political agenda.” Cornell, Originalism on Trial, supra note 8, at
630.
32.
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harbors” for the categories of gun laws listed by the Court, as well as those
that seem analogous to the listed categories. Although there is still substantial
uncertainty about the impact of Heller, based on the decision alone, there
is little reason to believe that gun restrictions short of the kind of handgun
ban struck down in that case will be in serious jeopardy. As professor Adam
Winkler of UCLA Law School has said, “the Heller case is a landmark decision
that has not changed very much at all.”36
In McDonald, Justice Alito’s lead opinion restated the Heller assurances
about the continued presumptive constitutionality of gun regulations, and
added, “We repeat those assurances here.”37 This strong endorsement of the
Heller dicta suggests that it may well furnish “safe harbors” for a wide variety
of strict state and local gun regulations that no doubt will be challenged in the
wake of McDonald.
Before Heller and McDonald, gun control was a policy issue, not a constitutional
issue. It may largely remain that way after those decisions.
The Gun Policy Debate
In contrast to the Second Amendment issue, where Tushnet’s conclusions
are fairly described as weak, his conclusions on gun policy are quite strong. In
his view, the only gun control policy that “might have an impact on gun-related
violence, at least eventually,” would be “a nationwide ban on the private
ownership of guns coupled with a policy of confiscating all guns already in
private possession” (77). As he accurately observes, “as a political matter there
is no chance whatever that such a ban will be enacted” (77). After Heller and
McDonald, of course, such a policy obviously would be unconstitutional as well.
As to less restrictive policies, he concludes: “Here the evidence seems pretty
clear that any gun-related policy likely to survive a political process deeply
affected by the culture wars will not do much to reduce violence”38 (xvii).
Tushnet offers no serious support for this sweeping dismissal of all gun
control policies short of total confiscation. For example, he focuses on so-called
“safe storage” laws enacted in many states that impose criminal penalties on
gun owners when a shooting occurs because a loaded, unlocked gun is stored
accessible to children. He dismisses the effectiveness of such laws by citing a case
where a teenager unintentionally discharged a rifle at a raucous party, shooting
another teen in the head and killing him (73–74). Because the shooter’s parent
36.

Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
2009 (quoting Winkler) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html (last
visited August 13, 2010).

37.

McDonald No. 08–1521, at 39–40.

38.

For Tushnet, this conclusion also applies to policies seeking to curb violence through the
proliferation of firearms (xvii). Indeed, he devotes much space to an entertaining discussion
of the statistical maze surrounding the controversial claim by John Lott that state laws
making it easier to carry concealed weapons resulted in dramatic reductions in crime (79–
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Exploding the Myths that Paralyze American Gun Policy 131–38 (Potomac Books 2009).
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had been so irresponsible as to require the party’s guests to supply money,
alcohol, or drugs as the price of admission, Tushnet persuasively suggests
that a law requiring safe storage of firearms likely would not have induced the
parent to lock the household gun away (100). Of course, this proves only that
safe storage laws will not cause every gun owner to be responsible. It hardly
demonstrates that such laws are doomed to failure. Tushnet does not mention
the studies indicating that such laws have reduced adolescent suicide rates,39
as well as accidental shootings by children and teens.40
In his discussion of gun policy, Tushnet’s greatest sin is one of omission.
There is a vast scholarly literature supporting the effectiveness of gun control
laws that Tushnet simply ignores.41 Even setting aside the issues of suicide and
unintentional shootings, and focusing on gun crime, the research literature
supports several broad propositions suggesting that regulation of the legal
market in guns can reduce access to guns by dangerous people, with the effect
of lowering the incidence of homicides and gun injuries.
First, the experience of other western, industrialized nations strongly
suggests that gun restrictions can reduce homicide rates by making guns
less accessible to violent people. Here the pioneering work has been done
by Professor Franklin Zimring of the University of California, Berkeley Law
School, along with collaborator Gordon Hawkins. Zimring and Hawkins
compared U.S. crime with that of other industrialized nations and found
that the U.S. does not have significantly higher rates of crime, even violent
crime. Rates for assault in the United States are actually lower than in Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia and are nearly identical to those in Finland, the
Netherlands, and Poland.42 What distinguishes the U.S. from these other
countries is that U.S. crime is far more lethal. The rate of assaults leading
to death is several times higher in the U.S. than in Canada, New Zealand,
and Australia. Homicide rates in Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland are
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a fraction of the American homicide rate.43 Moreover, only in the U.S. do
firearms play a major role in violent crime. The U.S. is the only large industrial
democracy that reports firearms as involved in a majority of its homicides.44
These other nations have gun control laws that are far stronger than in
the U.S., although not nearly as strong as the “total confiscation” policy
Tushnet believes to be the only alternative with any chance of success. The
international crime data indicate that other countries have violent people
who commit violent crimes, but their strong gun laws reduce their use of guns
in crime, thus making crime far less lethal. Others may disagree with this
interpretation of the data, but Tushnet can fairly be criticized for reaching his
policy conclusions without accounting for them at all.
Second, the consistent pattern of interstate movement of guns used in crimes
also argues against Tushnet’s argument for gun law futility, yet is ignored in his
text. Generally speaking, in states with strong gun laws, guns used in crime are
acquired from gun dealers in other states with weaker gun laws. Conversely,
in states with weak gun laws, crime guns originate with dealers within that
state. One Johns Hopkins study of crime guns in twenty-five American cities
showed that in five cities in states with both licensing and registration laws,
a mean of 33.7 percent of crime guns were first sold by in-state gun dealers,
whereas in thirteen cities in states with neither licensing nor registration, 84.2
percent of crime guns originated with in-state dealers.45
What does this pattern tell us? There is no obvious reason for criminals to
prefer out-of-state sources for their guns. The interstate movement of crime
guns suggests that strong state regulation of the legal market in guns forces
criminals to access guns in other states. It also supports the idea that strong
federal regulation of the legal market could reduce criminal access to guns
more effectively than state regulation by reducing the capacity of criminals to
exploit weak state gun laws.
Third, the nation’s experience with the Brady Act, which mandates a
background check on persons buying guns from licensed dealers, also suggests
that even fairly modest gun restrictions can reduce the use of guns in crime. I
have summarized the key data elsewhere:
Although, as the NRA often points out, violent crime rates began declining
shortly before the Brady Act went into effect in 1994, the use of firearms in
violent crime did not begin its sharp decline until that year. In the five years
preceding Brady, the percentage of violent crimes committed with firearms
increased every year. Beginning in 1994, a stunning reversal occurred. The
proportion of nonlethal violent crimes committed with firearms declined
by 45 percent from its high point in 1993 to 2004. Even more remarkable is
43.
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the decline in the absolute number of nonlethal violent gun crimes, from
1,054,820 in 1993 to 280,890 in 2004, a drop of 73 percent. During the same
period, gun homicides dropped 37 percent, driving a 34 percent decline in
all homicides. During those same years, an estimated 1,228,000 criminals and
other prohibited purchasers were blocked by Brady background checks from
buying guns from licensed gun dealers.46

Of course, there likely were a number of factors contributing to the sharp
reduction in crime during that ten-year period. But the data certainly support
an inference that the Brady Act played a role in reducing the use of guns in
crime, with a resulting reduction in homicides.47 The Brady Act record also
supports extending Brady background checks to private sales at gun shows
and elsewhere, as reflected in legislation currently pending in Congress.
Without at least addressing the decline in gun crime following the Brady Act,
Tushnet is far too quick to dismiss the possible impact of regulatory proposals
that fall short of a broad gun ban.
Obviously Professor Tushnet did not set out to write the definitive treatise
on gun control policy. Out of Range, including notes, is only 150 pages long.
It is certainly Tushnet’s prerogative to take an abbreviated stroll through the
policy issues. Such an approach, however, should avoid the kind of strong
conclusions that only a more comprehensive treatment could adequately
support.
The Future of the Gun Debate
Tushnet’s view that no politically feasible gun laws will ever do much to
reduce gun violence leads him to advocate avoiding the culture wars entirely
by redirecting the debate over violence away from the gun issue altogether:
So maybe we should simply turn our attention to other policies that might
be more effective in fighting crime and violence: more police on the streets,
ensuring that young people have better access to education and jobs, more
disparagement by leading public figures of violence on television and in
movies, or whatever else serious inquiry into the causes of crime and violence
reveals to be somewhat effective policies. This is not a book about such
policies, and I don’t know whether there are any decent effective ones. But,
it seems, gun policies aren’t all that effective, and fighting over them might
simply be a diversion from efforts that might be more effective (131).
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Obviously, there are many strategies for fighting crime and violence not
involving gun control that should be explored and implemented (though
Tushnet is willing to jettison gun control entirely while making no attempt to
show the effectiveness of alternatives). Given the substantial evidence of the
lifesaving benefits of gun regulation, however, it would be a tragic mistake to
simply abandon that effort as a way of disarming the culture war. Indeed, the
effectiveness of these other measures would certainly be compromised by a
policy that, for example, continues to allow criminals to buy guns from gun
shows with no questions asked. Does it make sense to put more police on the
streets and yet allow criminals easy access to the weaponry that threatens the
lives of those same police officers?
Whereas Tushnet is convinced that the gun issue inevitably provokes
a divisive culture war that paralyzes effective action, I suggest a different
perspective. There is no question that it is possible to frame the gun issue as
primarily a cultural issue. Indeed, framing it in this way is highly beneficial
to the gun lobby. If gun control is seen as an attack on the value systems of
millions of gun-owning Americans, this allows the NRA to radicalize and
mobilize gun owners to oppose even modest changes in our nation’s gun laws.
However, framing the issue as primarily cultural is not inevitable. As
Tushnet himself notes, quoting political scientist Morris Fiorina, “A solid
majority of blue state voters support stricter gun-control laws, but so does a
narrow majority of red state voters” (132). Recent polling data makes the point
even more dramatically. A poll taken by Republican messaging guru Frank
Luntz found that 86 percent of gun owners who do not belong to the NRA,
and 69 percent of self-described NRA members, support closing the “gun
show loophole” by extending Brady Act background checks to private sales
at gun shows.48 An op-ed by Luntz and Milwaukee’s Democratic Mayor Tom
Barrett reported that “the poll also found support among NRA members and
other gun owners for numerous other policies to strengthen safety, security
and law enforcement,” including blocking gun sales to persons on the terrorist
watch list, requiring gun owners to report lost and stolen guns, and providing
more crime gun data to local police.49 Indeed, there is a long history of polling
showing that gun owners, by substantial majorities, support such policies
as licensing and registration.50 When significant proportions of supposedly
opposing cultural groups support the same policies, then, as Luntz and
Barrett suggest, “the culture war over the right to bear arms isn’t much of a
war after all.”51
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Recent history shows that it is possible to overcome the gun lobby’s cultural
framing and redirect the national conversation to the merits of specific gun
control proposals. Indeed, President Clinton was a master at making the issue
about public safety, not culture. He marshaled the support of law enforcement
officials, who speak with ultimate credibility about the real world danger of
easy criminal access to guns, but could hardly be accused of being “anti-gun.”
His skillful handling of the issue resulted in passage of the Brady Bill and the
assault weapon ban (which, unfortunately, expired in 2004).
Ironically, the Heller decision, over the long run, may help to reduce
the power of the gun lobby’s cultural frame by reducing the impact of the
“slippery slope” argument. Some years ago, the NRA’s Wayne LaPierre
described “the plan” which is “so obvious to all who would see: First Step,
enact a nationwide firearms waiting period law. Second Step, when the waiting
period doesn’t reduce crime, and it won’t, enact a nationwide registration law.
Final Step, confiscate all the registered firearms.”52 This kind of slippery slope
argumentation is how the NRA uses the fear of ultimate gun confiscation to
rally gun owners against gun regulations they actually support on the merits.
What happens to the slippery slope argument after Heller? By creating a
new personal right to a gun in the home for self-defense, the Heller Court,
in Justice Scalia’s words, took broad gun bans “off the table” as a policy
alternative.53 If broad gun bans are “off the table,” there is reason to believe
that, over the long term, it will be more and more difficult for the NRA to
sell gun owners on the idea that any strengthening of our gun laws is but a
step toward gun confiscation. I am not suggesting that the NRA will abandon
that argument, or that the group will no longer be successful in motivating a
segment of American gun owners to oppose sensible controls. However, it may
be that, over time, those arguments will prove less and less effective, and the
cultural framing of the issue will begin to dissolve. By the same token, Heller
may enhance the efforts of gun control advocates to frame the debate in terms
of public safety, not cultural norms, as well as making it harder for politicians
to hide behind the slippery slope argument to justify their opposition to laws
that make sense when considered on their merits.54 A national debate on policy
initiatives like mandating Brady background checks on private sales at gun
shows, free from the fear that it may lead to gun confiscation, is far more fertile
terrain for advocates of gun control.
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Contrary to the picture Tushnet paints of the gun issue as an endless,
pointless cultural battle, it is far closer to reality to see it as the strategic use
of cultural appeals by a highly motivated and well-organized minority to
frustrate the will of the majority to enact gun restrictions that reduce access to
guns by dangerous people but allow the law-abiding to own them. We do need
a new, national conversation about guns, but not one that surrenders to the
cultural warriors all hope of bringing sanity to our nation’s gun policy. And
yes, Professor Tushnet, there is a great deal at stake: the safety of our children,
our families and our communities.
*Editors’ Note: The printed version of this book review inadvertently omitted the words, “Tushnet asserts,”
in the quotation at the bottom of page 326 referring to Tushnet’s definition of a militia. We have corrected
the error in this pdf and sincerely regret the omission.

